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I 
During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the conflict between secular states and the papacy 
was a central issue to the development of nations. This paper intends to outline how Pope 
Boniface VIII (1294-1303), in his struggle with King Philip IV le Bel of France (1268-1314), 
had an ultimate objective to create a theocratic government under which all other nations existed, 
essentially creating a Christian nation without borders, as God is everywhere and should not be 
limited to temporal sovereign limitations. The role of church influence in national affairs had 
reached its apex under the feudal system, however feudalism was beginning to decline with the 
changes in economy, trade and commerce, urbanization, population growth and included a 
change in mentality. An idea of an independent Christian kingdom, which was anathema to the 
papacy, had begun to grow. The battle of King Philip and Pope Boniface emphasized the 
growing concept of state versus church. 
The policies of Boniface were primarily focused on putting the French monarch squarely 
under the power of the spiritual authority of the pope. However, it backfired and caused criticism 
towards the papacy that led to Boniface’s conflict with Philip leading to his deposition as pope 
by an army led by Guillaume of Nogaret, Philip’s chief minister, and Sciarra Colonna, who was 
a member of a major clan that opposed Boniface in the church. After he died in captivity on 
October 11th 1303, he was posthumously tried for heresy and subsequent excommunication by 
the French prime minister. What were Pope Boniface’s goals in this struggle? Was Boniface 
seeking to satisfy his personal desires to dominate or was his ultimate objective to revive the 
Catholic Church as the supreme power over all of Christendom, both temporal and spiritual? The 
various actions that Boniface took outline some of his more prominent ideologies on what the 
role the church should be in relation to itself, but also earthly affairs, specifically the issuing of 
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his three most famous bulls. The struggle between Philip and Boniface shows that nation 
building is not just a battle of words, but economic and political consolidation of national 
interests. However, an important link is missing between the rise of Benedict Caetani and his 
anti-secular policies and his attempt to expand the ultimate power of the church to ever corner of 
the Christian world. The struggle between France and the pope helps us to get some perspective 
on the rising proto-nationalism on the part of some European kingdoms. 
 
 
II 
The early experiences of Benedict Caetani may shed some light on how he viewed the role of the 
church. Benedict’s contact with France began as early as 1264 on a mission to negotiate at the 
French court between the conflicting claims of Aragon, Castille and Naples over Sicily. At this 
point, perhaps some of the ideas of what the role of church was began to take root in his mind. 
Benedict saw first-hand what papal negotiations were like as he served under the soon to be Pope 
Martin IV, Simon of Brie. Benedict’s experience of 1264 surely influenced his later endeavors 
for centralizing the spiritual authority of the pope. Further exposure to foreign affairs took place 
when he was sent to England to support the zealot king, Henry III (1207-1272). Pope Clemente 
IV (1265-68) sent Cardinal Ottoboni Fieschi (1205-1276) to England to aid the English king in 
his struggle as he was an ally of the church. Ottoboni arrived in France in 1265, upon where 
Benedict was added to his entourage. Clearly, the authority of the papacy was impressed upon 
Benedict as he saw kings bow to the might of Peter’s spiritual descendant. 
 Later, he was assigned to the collection of a papal tithe in France in 1276. There is a bit 
of irony that his first supervisory position was dealing with taxation in France. Benedict was 
5 
 
heavily involved with economic issues, papal notaries and was an ally of many Angevin 
influences, including Martin IV (1281-85) and was described by him as “fervid in zeal for the 
honor of Anjou and the exaltation of the Kingdom.” This may have been his ideas as a middle-
aged man, but they were soon to change. When Benedict stated that “As a cardinal, I was a 
Gallican, so that often my Roman brothers rebuked me,” he was saying that to succeed he needed 
not to be a Roman, but a Gallican to use his allies to achieve greatness. When he achieved the 
pontificate, his priorities were to strengthen the church not only for himself, but for 
the Caetani clan. Benedict was seeing the universal endeavors of the church beginning to bend 
towards the will of secular state, as a great amount of influence came from the French cardinals. 
His neutrality during the elections of Celestine shows that he had realized that furthering French 
influence in the papacy was having a negative effect on the universal nature of the church. The 
control of the papacy was slipping from the hands of the pope into those of kings. 
 
 
III 
In the conflict between Aragon and the French Benedict undertook his first diplomatic mission as 
leader. With the removal of the Hohenstaufens from Sicily and Naples, Charles of Anjou, brother 
of the French king Philip IV, assumed the Guardianship of the city of Rome. However, due to 
Charles’ poor leadership quality of Sicily inspired a popular revolt at Palermo on Easter of 1282. 
The French in Palermo were slaughtered.  Before Charles could land his fleet in Messina, Pedro 
III of Aragon (1239-1285) landed and decreed Sicily for his wife, Constance, the daughter of 
Manfred and rightful claimant to the island. Pedro was excommunicated and Aragon given to 
Charles. In the negotiations Benedict played a grand role, being praised by Martin IV again when 
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he said that Benedict was “a man of deep counsel, a man of trust, secret, industrious, 
circumspect”. These traits run counterpoint to his attributes later in life, which may point to a 
change in his personality, perception of world view or even a church not based in the power of 
the French nation that he was involved in forwarding such an agenda.    
By the end of the 1280’s, Benedict had reached the apex of his cardinal power. He had 
become a frequent advisor to Pope Nicholas IV (1288-1292).  Benedict furthered his political 
power with the death of the Bishop of Paris, a member the Conti family and linked to the 
Caetani, turning the posthumous affairs to aid fellow Anagnites and reinforce his own 
powerbase. In 1291, his brother, Roffred had been selected as a senator in Rome and on October 
3rd Benedict was ordained as priest, and then appointed by Nicholas IV as Cardinal of St. Martin 
in Montibus. All of these signs of ascending power would be put on hold by the death of 
Nicholas IV on April 4th. During the papal election that followed, Benedict was neutral in every 
aspect. Through the plague and riots, Benedict had removed himself in 1292 not to Rieti with the 
other cardinals, but to his country estate in Sismano in Viterbo. At this point, there is a notable 
change in the policies of Benedict, as previously they were generally in support of his French 
allies, but now they shift from that to quite neutral, if not slightly hostile. 
 The election of Celestine is the closing chapter in the ascendancy of Benedict. Celestine 
was a novice in the capacity of diplomatic relations, appointing the worst people and in general 
was naïve with his benevolence, although the pope did give strong support to his own sect, now 
called the Celestinians.1 Celestine was an extremely pious man, but sometimes piety and the 
demands of politics do not mesh. By August of 1292, Celestine had been elevated from hermit to 
pope and immediate problems arose. Hoping to directly control to the pope, the cardinals moved 
Celestine to Naples, where with the support of Charles of Naples, the pope would essentially 
                                                          
1 T.S.R. Boase, Boniface VIII (London: Constable, 1934), 44‐45. 
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become a prisoner of his own pontificate. Celestine, as devout as he was, he refused to be the 
man to lead the Catholic Church. He was out of his element and was unqualified in the art of 
politics and bureaucracy. An amateur in the papal world, he longed for a return to his simple life 
as a hermit in the caves on Mount Murrone. Celestine was said to be very trusting and would 
apply honors and benefices upon people simply just by their asking. This was a problem because 
it allowed for anyone who gained access to the pope to encourage the old hermit to give them 
something. In many cases, it was either money or a position. The cardinals were panicked 
because their puppet was becoming their nightmare.2 The consensus of the cardinals by 1296 
was that holiness does not always make a good pope. In December of that year, Celestine 
decreed the right of a pope to abdicate from a pontificate, which had never been done before. 
One account places Benedict as questioning the legality of the matter, while another shows that 
he may have mentioned it to the floundering hermit.3 Celestine then left Naples, where the 
cardinals had hopes to control him in a secure area to return to his former life. Benedict pursued 
Celestine and arrested him, believing he would evolve into a real threat based on those that 
supported him.  
Fanatics and hostile elements had moved to support Celestine for they had hopes he 
would have ushered in a Golden Age of revival having been disenfranchised by the depravity of 
the church. A poet by the name of Jacopone da Todi, had expressed hopes that Celestine would 
have brought a return to the apostolic life the spiritual Franciscans enjoyed.4 After having been 
captured by Benedict, he was imprisoned within the castle of Fumone near Anagni. On May 16th 
1296, Celestine V died, supposedly of natural causes. However as the tale spread of the capture 
                                                          
2 Ibid., 49. 
3 Giovanni Villani, “The Unscrupulous Accession of Boniface VIII” in Charles T. Wood, ed., Phillip the Fair and 
Boniface VIII: State vs. Papacy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), 20‐23. 
4 Sir Maurice Powicke, The Christian life in the middle ages and other essays, (London: Clarendon Press, 1976), 55. 
8 
 
of the former pope and his untimely death at the hands of his successor, Benedict Caetani now 
was quietly accused of his murder. Unfortunately for Benedict, Celestine was a far more 
dangerous man dead than alive. In the papal elections of 1297, Benedict was the third choice, but 
a clear choice as even the Colonna supported him with at least two votes. 5  
 
 
IV 
During the first year or so of Boniface’s pontificate, he first had to repair the damage that 
Celestine V had done with his irresponsible benevolence and pious ignorance.  With one swift 
act, Boniface revoked all of Celestine’s dispensations and appointments. Only the highest seats 
of investment could not be repealed. What this indicated is two things; the election of a non-
capable figure had damaged the church’s political authority and Boniface was willing to attempt 
to wrest control of the church back into the hands of one singularly strong pope. These repeals 
are not just correcting the errors, but more of an attempt to revive the papacy from the 
machinations of those who sought to create a puppet pope.  
Beyond the realm of repairing the papal infrastructure, England and France continued to 
wage war. The pope sought to interject himself between France and England, perhaps to end the 
fighting long enough for England to defeat the Scottish rebellion that was brewing on the 
northern border. This is not to say that Boniface favored Edward Longshanks over Philip IV, but 
Boniface did have an interest in maintaining many smaller nations rather than one empire. 
Boniface would be more able to exert control over minor states, however, Boniface was not in a 
                                                          
5 For fuller details see Boase, Boniface. 
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position to exert actual physical force upon the kings of France and England, but would be able 
to effect their war efforts in other ways.6 
The medieval church was a financial tyrant as it controlled many estates throughout 
Europe and was diverse in its ability to produce goods for market. The church also had the right 
to move money across national lines without molestation by kings. This gave the church a 
financial monopoly over most of Europe. Originally, taxes could be levied against monasteries, 
churches and convents in times of a crusade to help assist in deferring the cost of battling non-
Christians. However, this practice had become common and therefore had gone unregulated. As 
these monies from taxes made it much easier to wage war, their removal would seriously hamper 
a nation’s ability to conduct military operations.7 The clerical tax had become a staple of the 
kingdom’s revenue scheme. To obtain these tithes, they would be authorized by the regional 
bishop of said territory, and therein lays a problem for the church. If these bishops were to be 
appointed by the lay government and not the pope, then the allegiance of the bishop would be in 
question. Obviously, if a church official were to be appointed by a king, he would have an 
obligation to that king. This is what had been happening in many European kingdoms for quite 
some time and had been a constant thorn in the side of the papacy. To this extent, Boniface, in 
addition to revoking the privileges of kings to dip into ecclesiastic coffers, the pope also had to 
weaken the lay invested church officials.  
 The last crusader stronghold, Acre, had fallen in May of 1291 to the Muslims and 
effectively ended all military operations in the Holy Land. The continuation of these crusading 
payments to the states needed to be corrected, if not for simple administrative purposes, but 
would show who had control. If Boniface would be able to repeal the freedoms the kings had, it 
                                                          
6 Edgar Boutaric, “The Importance of Italian Affairs” in Wood, ed., State vs. Papacy, 29‐33. 
7 Charles‐Victor Langlois. “The Power Politics of France” in Wood, ed., State vs. Papacy, 34‐41. 
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would help revive the universal nature of the church. The economic power of the church would 
then be unsurpassed with economic and political strongholds in every kingdom with the ability to 
refuse or support kings at will, making the papacy the most important ally in all of Christendom. 
Allies are something that every ruler needs, but more importantly a secure physical region from 
which they can operate from creates a viable kingdom, without this, allies become enemies. 
Boniface knew this and had a plan. 
 
 
V 
Perhaps most telling of Boniface’s goals of centralizing the church comes from the conflict with 
the Colonna family. After the death of Celestine V, Boniface was elected as third choice with the 
support of two votes from Colonna cardinals. The Colonna knew that the new pope had been 
disconnected prior to his appointment, but now was consorting with the Orsini family. This 
presented a problem for the Colonna as it meant that their support of Boniface was not going to 
be returned. Their position within the church quickly became tenuous because of the installment 
of many relatives of the pope. Nepotism had always played a major role in papal politics and 
Boniface wanted to ensure that the Caetani family would benefit from his pontificate. The 
shrewd legal mind of Boniface also ensured that every action taken was to be done so 
legitimately and legally as not to be questioned. His family and allies were pushing the once 
influential Colonna clan out of power. This angered the Colonna because Boniface owed them 
his position. The issue with the Colonna came to a head after a negotiation had been made 
between Boniface and the Annibaldi family, from whom he was seeking to purchase a number of 
estates. What is interesting about these transactions is that they were all located along the road to 
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Rome and also connected Anagni and his other estates, effectively creating a ring of friendly 
territories. In a brazen attempt to halt Boniface’s purchase of these legal acquisitions, on May 3rd 
1297, the caravan moving the payment for the estates was seized by the Colonna. Within a week, 
the swift vengeance of Boniface was upon them, demanding the restoration of the stolen treasure.  
Stephen Colonna was to be given over to the pope as a criminal and as a punishment; the estates 
of Zagarolo, Colonna and Palestrina were to be handed over to the church. The loss of these 
estates left the Colonna without a base from which to operate from and gave the Caetani clan 
control over all of Campagna.  
 The response of the Colonna was equally as swift and speaks to one of the core problems 
that Boniface was dealing with: fracturing. On May 10th, the Colonna responded by stating that 
they did not believe Boniface to be the true pope. To remedy this, Boniface stripped two Colonna 
cardinals from the college and claimed in the bull In excelso thromo that the Colonna were a vile 
lot as their ancestor plotted against Pope Gregory XI with his enemies. The pope responded by 
further removing four generations of the Colonna from Christendom. This battle of words 
culminated on May 23rd as the Colonna were declared schismatic and were permanently excised 
from the church. The issue with the Colonna now was not the simple acquisition of lands to 
create a network of strongholds encompassing Rome. Now the Colonna threatened his goal of 
creating a centralized Christian government. The Colonna then appealed for outside assistance 
from France, furthering the need for Boniface to crush them. To this end, Boniface called for a 
crusade against the Colonna on December 14th.  This was an extreme measure, but Boniface was 
never known for his subtlety. By the summer of 1299, the last strongholds of the Colonna were 
laid to ruins. The interaction with the Colonna created this physical territory in which the pope 
was able to dominate and gave him the ability to look outwardly towards his foes more readily as 
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he had vanquished a major opponent within Italy. Boniface may have been acting 
opportunistically, but even in that frame of mind, it still shows that the pope was endeavoring to 
create a centralized state from which his theocracy could operate from.  
 
 
VI 
On February 25th, 1296, Boniface issued the Clericis Laicos, translated as “priests of the laity”, 
referring to non-priestly figures controlling the church. This bull was specifically aimed at the 
secular states that gathered taxes from church lands within their sovereign borders. This bull also 
brought the sovereignty of kings into question.8 The language of this bull is generally hostile 
towards the actions of individuals or states against the church and affirms that anyone who takes 
money from the church will be excommunicated immediately. In addition, the bull states that any 
church official that does give money to secular authorities when pressured will face the same 
penalty. Further, the Clericis Laicos places the ability for any taxation of church estates to be 
granted only by the will of the pope. The goal of this document was to increase the funding to the 
church while weakening that of the secular leaders. The Clericis Laicos is not specifically 
regarding lay investiture, but it is a prevalent thought of the time.9 
 The response to Boniface’s bull was generally accepted by the smaller states, but only 
France and England had the ability to resist the papacy at this point. The issue that was taken by 
the two secular powers was the language used in the bull and the attitude exhibited that may have 
indicated a strict interpretation. The modern general conception of this bull is that Boniface was 
attempting to interject himself between the two most prominent nations of his pontificate, 
                                                          
8 Brian Tierney. The Crisis of Church & State, 1050‐1300. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice‐Hall, 1964), 173. 
9 Brian Tierney, The Middle Ages (New York: Cornell University, 1999), 287‐90. 
13 
 
namely to increase the power of the church, but at the same time satisfy his personal goals of 
domination. However, in this case, the Clericis Laicos might be seen as a precursor to the papal 
supremacy. As England had two issues, namely France across the channel and the Scottish rebels 
to the north, their objections would be quashed. However, further diplomatic endeavors were put 
on hold as Boniface had to deal with many cardinals who protested, many with other interests 
within their respective nations. King Philip’s bureaucracy made quick work of the language in 
the bull and put Boniface on the defensive. Finding a common enemy with the Colonna in the 
new pope, Boniface was made to explain his position. In addition to this, Philip banned the 
movement of gold out of France following the issuing of the Clericis Laicos. Anyone found to be 
doing so would be charged with treason. By sealing the borders, Philip appears to circumvent the 
pope’s decree. A great deal of the church’s income came from these estates in France and being 
cut off from them would be just as bad as if Philip were taxing them heavily.10 
The pope was up against a wall. With the negative response from the Curia, he was 
forced to make concessions that taxes were able to be levied without the consent of the pope in 
the case of national emergencies. The bull Esti de Statu was issued to give the French king less 
of a reason to ally with the beleaguered Colonna, whom emissaries had already met with the 
rebel friars. This was used by Peter Flotte, Philip IV’s prime minister, as a bargaining chip to 
encourage Boniface to revoke the Clericis Laicos. The Colonna felt betrayed, having their 
potential ally removed, but the French king was the ultimate winner as he defeated the pope, 
permanently reducing his authority with secular rulers. This is not to say that other kingdoms did 
not adhere to the will of the pope, but many of the kingdoms did not become involved with the 
struggle between the French king and the pope. Defeated as Boniface was, this blow did not 
                                                          
10 See Rose Graham. “A Petition to Boniface VIII from the Clergy of the Province of Canterbury in 1297”, The 
English Historical Review, vol. 37, no. 145 (1922): 35‐46. 
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reduce his tenacity. The French court, content that they had swiftly rebuked the foolish pope 
continued on with its affairs as planned. Boniface however was not deterred and his plans to 
subjugate the temporal authorities to the spiritual were only slowed. The pope’s focus was firmly 
on Philip as he has resisted. If France were to capitulate, the Christian theocracy with Boniface at 
its head would succeed. The flexing of political wills had subsided for now, Philip having been 
victorious, but shortly the struggle for supremacy would resume.  
 
 
VII 
Following the generally successful Clericis Laicos and the Jubilee of 1300, the struggle for 
power between Philip and Boniface resumed. It came in the form of questioning who had the 
ultimate authority to judge bishops, which judgment was solely in the hands of the pope. In 
1301, Philip ordered the arrest of Bishop Bernard Saisset of Pamiers (1232-1314) on charges of 
heresy, blasphemy and treason. He was brought before the king, tried and sentenced to prison. 
Following the trial, the king had a transcript of the events sent to Boniface in Rome. Within the 
letter sent to Boniface, Philip ordered the pope to acknowledge and agree to these proceedings. It 
was a basic ploy, if the pope would agree to this, it would set a precedent for secular authorities 
to try, convict and imprison church officials without the consent of the pope. This would be 
blatantly against the policies of Boniface as they would weaken the position of the pope, while at 
the same time giving precedent for an expansion of lay investiture by secular authorities. The 
response was an absolute deadlock of wills. The pope ordered that all cardinals report to Rome 
for a discussion of France and its role within the Christian world, all the while papal bulls 
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commanded the release of Bernard Saisset and annulling all benefices given to the French king. 
Counter to this, Philip demanded that no French cardinal attend this meeting.  
On the subject of King Philip, he was a secretive king and hid quite well behind a screen 
of skilled diplomats and cunning ministers. The court of Philip was ruthless and efficient and 
protected its interests with great ferocity. Generally, Philip was a constitutional king, abiding by 
the laws that had been set forth. However, even as Philip followed the law closely, the methods 
employed were less than scrupulous. One of the major charges against Bernard Saisset was that 
he practiced black magic, leading one to assume that when all legal methods fail to indict an 
individual, applying the charge of devil worship or black magic nearly always ensures that the 
trial ends in the desired conclusion.  
Boniface’s second bull, Asculta Fili, clearly reveals his idea of theocratic centralism. The 
Asculta Fili, literally translated as “Listen, my son”, opening with an appeal to the French king, 
who is describes him as a wayward sinner and admonishes him to return to the fold of the church 
to gain salvation. This bull outlines how the pope is the spiritual successor to Peter, the one and 
true judge of God and that there can be only one ultimate authority within the church. In contrast 
to the Clericis Laicos, the language of the first half of the bull is less brutal, less ascorbic and 
more a reasoned declaration that the pope is right. The other half of the bull seems to be written 
in anger and by popular accounts more closely reflects his personality. Much more aggressively, 
the bull reads the litany of things that Philip has done in opposition to the church. The goal of 
this bull is clear, reduce the power of the French king and encourage him to submit to the legal 
and spiritual authority of the pope.11   
The call of the pope for a meeting on the October 30th, 1302 in Rome to discuss the issue 
with France was an abysmal failure. Philip forbade the French bishops from attending and many 
                                                          
11 Tierney, Crisis, 185‐86 
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listened. Only thirty-six bishops from France attended out of seventy-eight and none who did 
were from the north. In addition, only four archbishops attended; Bernard of Got, archbishop of 
Bordeaux, Reginald of Montbason, archbishop of Tours, Giles of Bourges, resident of Rome and 
the Archbishop of Auch.12 The meeting amounted to nothing. This shows the weakening power 
of the pope as the church officials are more inclined to adhere to the wishes of a secular ruler 
over that the spiritual. It should be said at this point that King Philip was not active vindictively 
towards the bishops within France, but the letter of the law was to be applied to the bishops. 
Philip was following the policies set forth to ensure a legal government, attempting to secure 
itself from domination from an extra national entity.13 This aspect will be explored more fully 
later. However, the anger of Boniface was now raised to such a height that the ultimate response 
was necessary to finish this matter and with it, the will of the French king. 
 
 
VIII 
On the 18th of November 1302, Pope Boniface issued one of the most well-known papal bulls of 
all time specifically regarding the issue of church and state: the Unam Sanctam. The Unam 
Sanctam, translated as “one church”, opens with a definitive statement: “That there is one holy, 
Catholic and apostolic church we are bound to…” and “that outside this church there is no 
salvation or remission of sins…” The goal of the Unam Sanctam has been greatly discussed over 
the years. Did Boniface want temporal as well as spiritual authority in national affairs or was this 
a personal struggle? At first glance, the Unam Sanctam reads as an admonition of Philip. It 
adduces to scriptures to liken the French king and his court to the Greeks who doubted Peter and 
                                                          
12 Boase, Boniface, 316. 
13 See Joseph R Strayer. “Philip the Fair: A “Constitutional King””. The American Historical Review, vol. 62, No. 1 
(1956): 18‐32. 
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states that the pope does not make errors as he is the will of God, but humans are prone to err and 
thus should be judged accordingly. However, there is nothing new in the Unam Sanctam 
regarding the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal. This document claims that 
domination of temporal authority comes from the scriptural statement, “Lo, I have set thee this 
day over the nations and over kingdoms.” Even portions of the document have been reworded 
versions from Thomas Aquinas. The papal policy of Boniface at this point begins to aim towards 
a maintaining universality. The issue now is that the pope needs to define with ultimate clarity 
what the role between state and papacy would be. This document pertains to three important 
issues: the failed meeting of the bishops in Rome, the struggle for the Church to remain universal 
and the personality of the pope.14 
Giles of Rome, in his De Eccesiastica Potestate, discussed the meaning of what the 
Unam Sanctam was trying to communicate. The goal of the bull was to prevent chaos from 
reigning, specifically by restoring the order of God. The chaos that would occur if the will of 
princes and kings were to rival that of the pope is expressed by Giles. Giles does not say either is 
evil, but rather it is the natural law that must be observed. The concept of the Two Swords is 
discussed, asserting that it is rightly the will of God, not the pope that guides the spiritual sword 
and if the temporal is not subject to the spiritual, then the temporal is not following the will of 
God since the temporal is not ordained by God. This simple logical argument explains the 
position of Boniface much more clearly as the Unam Sanctam uses metaphor and indirect 
language. Giles speaks directly to the problem and clearly states that the issue here is that the 
recognition of the will of God by the temporal is why the pope is pushing this agenda. Without 
the subservience to the will of God, then all that the kings of the world, who attained their 
kingdoms by “invasion and usurpation…” then “kingdoms without justice are great bands of 
                                                          
14 Tierney, Crisis, 188‐89 
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robbers…” and since justice comes from God, meaning that “such rulers are not kings although 
they are called kings, but rather thieves and robbers.” What Giles is stating is that without the 
will of God, which is the natural law of things, there can be no clear role within God’s plan 
without being led by the vicar of God.15 
For the church to remain universal in nature there can only be one church. Without a 
single, strong, centralized theocratic infrastructure and doctrine, the church cannot be a well 
defined entity. Therefore, there can be only one leader that the church must follow. As the pope 
is the spiritual descendant of Peter, anointed by Jesus, son of God, there can be no doubting that 
the pope is the only one that can effectively rule the church. Division within the church is not 
acceptable because any church official who does not follow the guiding will of the pope by 
definition is not part of the will of God. In Boniface’s mind, there was an issue of division that 
was omnipresent in his mind at the time when this papal bull was written. The events of the last 
few years have outlined how this is important. Kings many not charge bishops with crimes, then 
try and imprison them, that is for the pope to decide. Rebels calling for the resignation of the 
pope are anathema. There should be only one unquestionable authority within the church. This 
authority is not because the pope wants it, although Boniface was the type of man who may have 
wanted this, but because division leads to weakness, and weakness leads to collapse. The policies 
of Boniface all point towards this.   
An interesting aspect of the events of 1302 is how France reacted to this decree. Firstly, 
King Philip refused to listen to the reading of the papal bull. After his ministers read the bull, 
they responded not directly at first to the pope, but rather disseminated copies of the letter to the 
cities of France. The ministers released copies of the Clericis Laicos that were blatant forgeries 
with slightly modified language that encouraged the reader to hear the aggressive language as an 
                                                          
15 Ibid., 198‐99. 
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attack on the French people; thereby Philip would be able to gain popular support for the 
deposition of the pope and subsequent death and posthumous trial. This may suggest that Philip’s 
ministers had been planning a reaction like this since the receipt of the Clericis Laicos in 1296. If 
that were the case, then it may imply that the political machine of Philip’s bureaucracy had a 
long vision and the capacity to execute long term planning, a hallmark of successful nations. 
Philip’s skillful ministers were able to turn everything that Boniface had gambled for on its head 
and there was nothing that the pope could do at this point.16 
Though the Unam Sanctam has been seen by many historians as a statement of the pope’s 
supremacy over the temporal as well as the spiritual, there are some issues with this statement, 
when subjected to a closer examination.17 It was written shortly after the failed conclave with the 
bishops to discuss the issue with France. The fact that many of the bishops chose not to follow 
Boniface’s summons by not attending the gathering made their allegiances very clear, 
specifically that they were following commands not of the pope, and therefore they are denying 
the will of God. This is divisive and cannot be allowed, the temporal authority should never 
command the spiritual; “temporal authority should be subject to the spiritual.” In ecclesiastical 
terms, this document is attempting to the pope’s spiritual authority over the king’s temporal 
power. Philip, forbidding the bishops to attend the conclave in Rome is tantamount to spiritual 
matters, thus extending the will of the temporal into that of the spiritual. The cause of this 
transgression is King Philip and Boniface knew this. The pope’s ire against the French king was 
unbridled because every action that Boniface took to create a centralized theocracy was blocked 
and now even Boniface’s own bishops refused to heed his call.  
 
                                                          
16 Ibid., 187. 
17 Jean Riviere. “Boniface’s Theological Conservatism” in Wood ed., State vs. Papacy, 66‐70. 
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VIIII 
The goal of Boniface was singular in nature. His primary goal was to create a strong, 
independent church free from the constraints of temporal influence. The primary issues that he 
faced came from two areas: the influence of the French and repairing the damage done by 
Celestine V. The reversal of the decrees of Celestine was the first step in creating a centralized 
theocracy. The total sums of all of Boniface’s actions were aimed at restoring the church and 
setting it above the temporal. Not to dominate, per se, but it is clear that would be a byproduct of 
the exaltation of the spiritual over the temporal. Boniface’s failings were not wholly his to 
blame, but if account of his personality were correct, he being filled with anger, then letters 
written in the heat of the moment may have led to the malfunction of his policies. However, the 
bureaucracy of Philip and his ministers made short work of the papal bulls by creating forgeries 
to spread as propaganda against the pope. The pope’s legitimate attempt to restore the rightful 
place of the church as spiritual defender of humanity was thwarted not because of an ill 
intentioned pope, but rather because of the machinations of a blossoming nation, struggling to 
find its own identity.  
 Boniface knew that for the church to be successful, it needed funding. The Clericis 
Laicos was an attempt to retain those monies for the church. The church had no major standing 
army, but it did have the ability to support kings in their endeavors and therefore it would be 
important to keep revenues strong, just like any kingdom would. If a kingdom’s source of 
revenue is under attack, then that ruler must protect it as wealth is a cornerstone to a successful 
society. Boniface understood the importance for a strong network of papal estates as they would 
provide resources and a sphere of influence from which the church could operate. This influence 
would allow for the expansion of papal policies without having to contend with solid national 
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borders. Through the conglomeration of the ring of castles surrounding Rome, Boniface’s 
kingdom had been secured, but the attempts to secure the respect and fear of the temporal leaders 
is what Boniface’s ultimate goal was.   
The policies of Boniface all point towards the creation of a centralized theocratic state 
without borders over all of Christendom. His goal was to create a stronghold in Italy supported 
by a network of castles to reinforce the physical aspects of the new papal kingdom. Boniface 
sought to secure the revenues of the church abroad and remove greedy hands that legally had no 
claim to the monies that rightfully belonged to the church. Boniface endeavored to excise 
malignant entities within the church as if they opposed him, then the creation of a strong 
temporal papal state would not come to fruition.  All of these actions were aimed at creating a 
viable state of God on earth to compete with the temporal authorities. Perhaps one of the central 
tenants that Boniface believed whole-heartedly was that “the spiritual power has to institute the 
earthly power…”18 In addition to this, Boniface had to repeal the actions of Celestine V as they 
were ill-conceived by his handlers and reckless in essence.  
 
 
X 
The days of the papacy as a political dynamo had come to an end. The world was changing and 
the role of the papacy was changing with it. No longer did states see fit to beg permission to 
engage in their own pursuits, but rather seek their own destiny according to the temporal, rather 
than the spiritual. The world of pre-1300’s Europe needed the guidance of the church until the 
nations were able to stand on their own laurels. The failure of Celestine V’s pontificate allowed 
                                                          
18 Tierney, Crisis, 188‐89. 
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France to throw off the shackles on papal influence, indeed to the point where King Philip and 
his cunning ministers subsumed the papacy.  
 Boniface’s political goal was not to control just for himself, but for the next pope as well. 
It should not be said that Pope Boniface was a philanthropist, far from it in fact, but his 
intentions were not malicious. Boniface sought only what other temporal rulers were beginning 
to enjoy, specifically a secure and centralized nation. Truly the kingdom of France and England 
was central to wherever the king was; this is what the pope wanted. The church was divided 
among the secular influences all trying to bend and shape the church to serve their own national 
agendas. Boniface should be seen not as a dominator or a hateful antinationalist, but rather as a 
provider and a figure of great importance. Boniface’s struggle with King Philip inadvertently 
assisted in the creation of the proto-nation. The lessons that were learned about statecraft in 
addition to the shrewdness and skill that was employed during the conflict could have far ranging 
effects on statecraft going forward. Boniface’s theory of theocratic centralism was an idea that 
was outdated, but his attempt to enforce the authority of the Church and God on Europe helped 
spur Europe into a new era of nationhood free from the constraints of a church dedicated to 
influencing and scheming to keep the nations of men under its august guidance. Not all mistakes 
are errors, as the pope was convicted of heresy and excommunicated. When Boniface’s tomb 
was opened in 1605, he was found to be intact, a sure sign of sainthood. Boniface was canonized 
and his previous crimes were removed. If Boniface was a saint, a true messenger of God, the 
perhaps everything that he set out to do was part of the God’s works and therefore, within the 
Christian realm, exactly what was intended to happen. The truth of the matter will never be fully 
understood if that Boniface’s goals were selfish in nature or divinely inspired, but the evidence 
left behind is that the goals of Boniface were to create a temporal bastion of spiritual authority on 
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earth, allowing for the majesty of the descendant of Peter to rule supremely over both church and 
state.  
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